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Abstract: Large Critical Complex Infrastructures are increasingly dependent on IP 
networks. Reliability by redundancy and tolerance are an imperative for such 
dependable networks. In order to achieve the desired reliability, the detection of 
faults, misuse, and attacks is essential. This can be achieved by applying methods 
of intrusion detection. However, in large systems, these methods produce an 
uncontrollable vast amount of data which overwhelms human operators. This 
paper studies the role of alarm reduction and correlation in existing networks for 
building more intelligent safeguards that support and complement the decisions by 
the operator. We present an architecture that incorporates Intrusion Detection 
Systems as sensors, and provides quantitatively and qualitatively improved alarms 
to the human operator. Alarm reduction via static and adaptive filtering, 
aggregation, and correlation is demonstrated using realistic data from sensors such 
as Snort, Samhain, and Syslog. 
1 Introduction 
The economy and security of Europe is increasingly dependent on a range of Large 
Complex Critical Infrastructures (LCCI) such as electricity and telecommunication 
networks. Protecting these infrastructures requires an understanding of the vulnerabilities 
that exist in every layer of the network; from the physical layer up to the network and 
service layers as well as the organisational layer that supports the complex operation of 
these networks. This paper focuses on the support of operators analyzing messages 
created by various sources, in particular Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), 
Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) and general log data. The amount of data 
being produced by such Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) exceeds by far human 
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capability of information processing. One study [YBU03] estimates that the number of 
intrusion attempts over the entire Internet is in the order of 25 billion each day and 
increasing. McHugh [Hug01] claims that attacks are getting more and more sophisticated 
while they get more automated. This requires detailed analysis in-depth leaving no time 
for adequate reactions. Most INFOrmation SECurity systems (INFOSEC) based on IDS 
technology attempt to respond to the operator’s information overload. 
INFOSEC systems either apply knowledge-based techniques (typically realised as 
signature-based misuse detection), or behaviour-based techniques (e.g. by applying 
machine learning for detection of anomalies). On the other hand, there are tools 
performing methods of data mining (e.g. on log results), or by simply collecting and 
grouping alerts for further examination by a human operator [MCZ+00]. However, these 
INFOSEC systems generate far too many alarms. While post mortem studies are 
possible on large data sets, the ability of reacting in real-time to intrusions is highly 
dependent on improved quality of the alarms, and in particular reduction of the false 
alarm rates.  
When studying the range of problems in dealing with security issues in the management 
network of telecom service providers, the following needs are identified: (1) Reduction 
of the message counts such that the operator can cope with them. (2) A lower rate of 
false alarms. (3) Information collection and correlation from various sources to identify 
indices of attacks. (E.g. The combining of information about the network topology with 
IDS alarms). (4) Indication of general network “health” with predictive elements so that 
total service collapse is avoided. The work in this paper addresses the first two issues 
and to some extent the third issue which is a prerequisite for future sophisticated analysis 
of alarm data. The work is carried out in the context of the European Safeguard project 
[Saf03] aiming to demonstrate the use of distributed and coordinated software agents for 
enhancing existing defence mechanisms in telecom and electricity management 
networks. Safeguard agents at higher levels use data that is processed as presented in this 
paper. Thus, this paper describes methods how to improve the quality of IDS data, thus 
enabling a human operator to fulfil an in-depth analysis within acceptable time.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we present a safeguard architecture that 
has emerged during the work in the above project. Next, the improvement of the 
information quality of knowledge-based and behaviour-based approaches is discussed. 
The knowledge-based approach filters and aggregates alarms. Moreover, methods of 
automated text classifications utilizing naïve Bayesian networks are used to adapt the 
IDS filtering. Behaviour-based methods correlate the aggregated alarms. The three 
considered techniques are: An additive correlator, a Neuronal Network (NN) classifier, 
and a classifier based on K-nearest-neighbours. 
We evaluated our methods on data generated in a test network of appropriate size; 
because the datasets used for a number of recent evaluations of alarm correlation 
approaches [HA03] were not available to the wide research community. Our test 
network consists of 50 machines, and has been set up at Swisscom as part of the 
Safeguard research effort, especially for evaluating various approaches to recognition, 
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reaction and recovery mechanisms. The data produced for these experiments can be 
shared and tested by other researchers. Finally we comment on the conclusions so far.  
1.1. Related works 
Several proposals for alarm correlation (e.g. [CM02], [DW01], [MD03], [NCR02] and 
[PFV02]) are limited to predefined rules for attack scenarios and countermeasures. 
Another proposal to find new scenarios is given by Qin et al. [QL03]. A different 
approach is the probabilistic alert correlation taken by Valdes et al. [VS01], where a 
mathematical framework is used to collate alerts based on their similarity. Our 
mechanism is based on text based distance metrics combined with Neural Networks and 
K-nearest neighbours’ algorithms. 
The idea to perform data mining in order to reduce for false alarm has been explored by 
Julisch et al. [JD02]; using conceptual clustering of old alarms to derive new filters. Our 
method for adaptive filtering has the same objective, but we use automatic text 
classification instead.  
2 The Safeguard context 
The Safeguard architecture is outlined in Figure 1.  
Concerned LCCI
IDS
Wrapper
Diagnosis
Wrapper
Hybrid Detector
Agent
Topology Agent
HMI Agent
Negotiation
Agent
Actuator
Agent
Correlation
Agent
Action Agent
Other
LCCIs Work in this
paper
Legend
 
Figure 1: The Safeguard agent architecture 
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The roles of agents can be described as follows:  
• Wrapper agent: Wraps standard INFOSEC devices and existing LCCI 
diagnosis mechanisms, and applies static filtering and normalisation on their 
outputs.  
• Topology agent: Gather network topology information dynamically, e.g. host 
types, operating system types, services provided, known vulnerabilities.  
• Hybrid detector agent:  Uses data mining techniques such as clustering to 
detect anomalies.  
• Correlation agent: Filters, aggregates, and correlates (section 3.4) normalized 
messages from different sources.  Special filter lists are applied for network 
critical services [Bu03]. In practice the agent is split into a filter, an aggregation  
and a separate correlation and alarm generation part. 
• Action agent: Initiates automatic and human controlled responses.  
• Negotiation agent: Communicates with negotiation agents in neighboured 
LCCIs to pass on information. 
• HMI (Human Machine Interface) agent: Provide an interface supporting  the 
operator in his analysis. This agent also facilitates the incorporation of 
adjustable autonomy within the agent-based system [Sc01].  
• Actuator: Interface for communication with lower layer software and hardware 
(e.g. changing firewall rules, renicing or killing processes, traffic shaping). 
There may be several instances of each agent in each LCCI and only some variants are 
described in this paper. 
2.1 Choice of sensors 
As reported by Yin et al. [Yi03] the success of IDSs depends upon the data they process. 
In order to assess the relevance of an alarm, several sources of information have to be 
considered. For this reason we use three different INFOSEC devices.  One the network 
level, the NIDS Snort, on host level the HIDS Samhain and various agents providing 
information about system relevant information as well as application logs via Syslog are 
applied. Multiple sources of additional information such as network topology 
information, connection statistics, policies, and vulnerabilities are further included in our 
selection of sensors. Anomaly detectors for network traffic as described in [BN04]. 
Alarm Reduction and Correlation in Intrusion Detection Systems      13 
3 Alarm Reduction 
In the following we describe one possible human way of analysing alarms. The 
expressiveness of alarms is evaluated by its: 
• Severity • Variety 
• Number • Uniqueness  
• Frequency • Payload 
 
As outlined in Figure 2: Analysis procedure , the analysis starts by removing the alarms 
that are known to be of no interest. Syslog is checked for messages that look suspect. For 
each message found, the corresponding machine is checked in the HIDS to detect 
suspicious changes and the NIDS is checked for possible sources for attacks around the 
time that roughly coincides with the event. 
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Figure 2: Analysis procedure  
To enforce the relevance of alarms, knowledge about 
• The attack signatures in the payload 
• Perimeter defense settings (firewalls, reverse proxies, etc) 
• Host properties and vulnerabilities (Operation System, patch level, etc) 
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• Abnormal messages around the time for the alarms. (e.g. reboots, service 
failures, etc) 
The last step is to investigate the most frequent alarms. These may be an indication of 
misconfigurations or software bugs, denial of service attacks or virus respectively 
worms. 
Overall, the alarm analysis activities can be broadly grouped into filtering, aggregation 
and correlation. Using the sum of the severities during a time period captures some of 
the characteristics for listed alarms (high severity, lots of alarms and high rate). This is 
one of the approaches taken in this paper. 
Figure 3 presents the implementation in two of our agents based on the description 
above. Normalisation is the process to transform the data into a uniform format. 
Messages are aggregated using a text based distance metric. In the following the detail of 
static and adaptive filtering, aggregation and correlation is discussed. 
Snort Samhain Syslog
Static filtering
Normalisation
Adaptive
filtering
Aggregation
Correlation
Static filtering
Normalisation
Aggregation
Static filtering
Normalisation
Aggregation
Adaptive
filtering
Adaptive
filtering
Legend
Alarms
Filter
update
Higher levels
of processing
 
Figure 3: Overview of Methods 
3.1  Static filtering 
Under normal operations, IDSs produce a lot of messages, therefore it excessively time 
consuming to distinguish false alarms from real attacks. In particular there were a lot of 
uninteresting messages coming from untuned Syslog and Samhain. Practically in LCCIs, 
tuning requires a static network, were changes almost never happen or it requires a non-
affordable effort for the administration. The resulting amounts of uninteresting messages 
have a low severity, though through their number of occurrence, they cannot be 
neglected. Therefore static filters exclude data from Samhain and Syslog that does not 
carry any valuable information, such as messages that Samhain checks a file or that 
Syslog is doing a garbage collection.  
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Filters are implemented either as an ignore filter or as a delete filter. The ignore filters 
keep the alarms in the database but they are not forwarded to the next agent. But they are 
saved for forensic investigation. The delete filters removes alarms permanently from the 
database. All static filters have a limited duty cycle defined by the operator and have to 
be reactivated afterwards. 
3.2 Adaptive filtering 
Static filter deals with known problems. However, since it is not possible to foresee all 
future misconfigurations, adaptive filtering algorithms were implemented to suggest new 
filter rules to the administrator. This is based on Naïve Bayesian (NB) learning [Hec96]. 
The idea is to train a NB text classifier to classify messages by looking at word statistics 
of messages. The NB-classifier has to be trained first with a subset of messages labelled 
as interesting or not. During training, a knowledge base is automatically acquired, 
enabling the NB-classifier to assess whether unknown messages are interesting. 
The adaptive filters are used in the following workflow:  
1. For performance reasons, the algorithm for adaptive filtering is launched on a 
periodic basis. 
2. The algorithm suggests filter rules for top scoring events to a human expert via 
HMI.  
3. The reply is also used to optimise the training corpus, achieving on-line 
retraining. 
4. In order to avoid over learning effects, features, hardly ever occurring in time, 
are reduced in their significance and are finally forgotten. 
3.3 Aggregation 
Repeated, identical alarms do not provide any additional information. It would reduce 
the information overload if each all these alarms were represented in only one alarm 
including the number of its frequency. The relevant fields for aggregation have to be 
defined for each source individually. For Snort the source and destination IP, as well the 
server ports and the messages are relevant. Ephemeral ports can be ignored. For Syslog, 
the PID number is unimportant but the program and the message field is relevant. All 
data is aggregated within a given time window.  
3.4 Correlation 
Motivation to build an automatic correlation agent is the fact that human operators 
successfully correlate information from different INFOSEC mechanisms in search for 
known attacks. Moreover, humans are capable to find indications for attacks even though 
they are not known. However, the way a security expert analyses the information is 
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complicated therefore a complete model is impossible to find.  The correlator uses data 
from the NIDS, HIDS and SYSLOG to find indications of unknown attacks. 
All alarms regarding one host during a time window are considered, i.e. the selected 
correlation parameters are time, IP address, ports resp. application, etc. Given a time 
window, a time slot of a three dimensional vector is produced by taking the sum of 
severities from the three sensors. Based on the input pattern, the correlator decides 
whether this is an interesting alarm or not. For further processing just one single alarm is 
generated. The idea is illustrated in Figure 4.  
This three-dimensional vector is then used as input for the following three correlation 
algorithms:  
1. A simple additive correlator with the parameter ‘added severity threshold’ 
2. A neural network [Sim98] with a variable set of neurons and hidden layers. 
Training is achieved by back propagation. 
3. K-Nearest Neighbour [DGL96] with K as a variable parameter. 
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Figure 4: Alarms Appearing in Two Time Slots 
The additive correlator simply builds a weighted sum of the number of occurrences of 
the severities within a given timeslot. The sum is then compared to a threshold 
generating an alarm if the chosen limit is exceeded. By varying the threshold different 
detection rates and false positive rates can be achieved. The other two correlation 
algorithms must be first trained on a subset of data before it is applied to the new real 
time dataflow.  
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4 Evaluation 
4.1 Data generation 
The topology of the test network used to perform the evaluation is given in Figure 5.  
The test network is an image of a realistic IP environment and consists of: 
• A server zone and a workstation zone. Both zones consists of Sparc 5, 10 and 
20, Ultra 2,5,10 machines running Solaris 5.6 to 5.10 with various patch levels 
as well as several versions of Linux and PCs running on Windows 98,  NT, 
2000,  XP installed on VMWARE. 
• A jump-station running on OpenBSD can be used to login via SSH from the 
Internet. 
•  Switches, routers and a hub connecting the different nodes. 
• An external zone simulating the Internet in case of trials with worms, virus, and 
(D)DoS. 
This way, it is ensured, that no “bad” traffic contaminates the Internet.  
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192.168.200.0/25 Cisco Router 7000
Cisco Router 2514
Cisco Router 2514
Workstation zone
192.168.202.0/24
Server zone
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Figure 5: The Safeguard Telecom test network 
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From the test network data can be collected and labelled. This data may contain 
“normal” traffic and some attacks. In our experiments the attacks were performed using 
various tools and techniques, including:  
• Scanning of the network using ping script once, Nessus (www.nessus.org) four 
times and Nmap (www.insecure.org/nmap) five times. Both Nessus and Nmap 
are security scanners. 
• Brute-force password guessing for telnet with Brutus (www.hoobie.net/brutus), 
attack used twice. 
• Sadmin buffer overflow attack, launched against two different hosts at separate 
times. 
• Installing a rootkit for Solaris 2.6 once (www.honeynet.org/papers/motives). 
• Various “bad” behaviour when logged in on a computer, such as allocating all 
space on the disk, killing as many processes as possible (once), imitating 
memory leaks. 
The attacks were launched from the external zone simulating Internet attacks and from 
the server or workstation zone simulating insider attacks. During the attacks, normal 
usage of the computers by people working on them generated normal background noise.  
Applying the resulting datasets led to the different experiments described in this paper. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Static filtering 
The data used to test the result of static filtering is gathered from all relevant hosts on the 
network during three weeks and includes alarms generated from attacks and from normal 
traffic. Figure 6 illustrates the result of static filtering on the Syslog, Snort alarms, and 
Samhain alarms. No alarms related to attacks were removed. Clearly Samhain alarms 
were reduced most drastically by this knowledge-based approach (order of magnitude). 
The method had the lowest impact on Snort alarms. This can be explained by the huge 
diversity of different network traffic patterns in contrast to the more precise knowledge 
of uninteresting Syslog and Samhain alarm types.  
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Figure 7: Static filtering for Snort Syslog and Samhain 
4.2.2 Adaptive filtering 
Text classification methods for adaptive filtering were applied to Syslog alarms. The 
data set used, when evaluating the adaptive filtering, consisted of messages collected 
over the period of two months. The data was labelled as “interesting” or “uninteresting” 
by a security expert. An interesting message contains valuable indications of an attack. 
For example, a message saying “telnetd[1]: Successful login as user root” or “File 
changed” is classified as interesting, but messages such as “Garbage collecting while 
idle” will be classified as uninteresting. When classifying the messages, the fields: 
Facility, Priority, Program and Message of each Syslog message were included. The 
field Level was excluded since it has the same value as the field priority.  
The whole data set contained 156 212 alarms, where 18 941 of them are classified as 
interesting. These alarms where then divided into different sets for training and testing. 
The test data set contained 53 722 alarms, where 10 621 of them are classified as 
interesting.  
Table 2 shows the results of the adaptive learning algorithm in terms of the precision of 
the results produced on the test data set. By precision here we mean the number of 
correct classification divided by the total number of alarms. 
Data set Correct classifications Incorrect classifications Precision 
Test part 53682 40 0,99926 
Table 1: Result of text classification for adaptive filtering 
As the last column indicates, the method is likely to classify the alarms with a very high 
precision as long as the selected attributes for classifying the alarm messages as 
interesting/uninteresting and the training data remain valid in the eyes of the security 
expert.  
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4.2.3 Aggregation 
Next we show the results of the aggregation algorithm, which is based on an edit 
distance measure with blank synchronisation. As long as the characters are the same, the 
next character is considered, if not, the next space is used for synchronisation. The 
number of equal characters in relation to the length is the percentage of similarity. 
 
Empirical tests showed that with more than 65% similarity the same messages are 
recognised as being identical. A similarity of 70% means a reduction for Snort of  96.5% 
(from 3755 to 130) and for Syslog of 99.8% (from 13691 to 28). 
  
Figure 7: Original and Aggregated Messages 
The influence of the time window size for the aggregation performance is shown in 
Figure 8. The data set being use here is smaller, but has the same characteristics as in 
above. 
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Figure 8: Number of Snort alarms after aggregation, varied size of time window 
Obviously, the larger the time window the fewer alarms are left after aggregation. In 
order to limit the delay until alarms are sent to the higher layer processes, the first 
instance of a new alarm is instantly sent while at end of the time window the final 
aggregation result is delivered. 
However, this is only the first stage in dealing with the information quality, and higher-
level correlation agents are dependent on recognition of anomalous situations within an 
adequate short time period for vital reactions [Bu03].  
4.2.4 Correlation  
As mentioned in chapter 3.4 we compared the messages from the NIDS, HIDS and 
Syslog to produce estimation for unknown attacks. Three techniques for behaviour-based 
correlation were applied. Figure 9 shows the additive correlator, a neural network and a 
1-nearest neighbour classifier algorithm. For the training we used a subset of eight hosts 
on the network during eight days. 
Using a time window of 15 minutes, 6 048 three-dimensional time slots were created. 54 
of the time slots were attacks. The dataset was divided into a training part, 3993 
timeslots, 36 of these timeslots were attacks and the test part was the remaining part. 
The additive correlator obviously gives less false positives (see ROC curve of Figure 9, 
left part) with a lower threshold but the detection rate decreases. For higher values of the 
threshold, the 1-NN algorithm and the neural network have lower false-positives rates. 
The neural network correlator had an overall better performance with detection rate of 
94,4% and false positives rate of 1.4%. Considering the vast amount of data being 
presented to a human per day this false positive rate is still rather high. Ongoing work 
using more correlation sources e.g. topology information, policy definition and health 
observations are expected to show significant improvement. 
Figure 9 (right part) shows the results of the study of the K-NN algorithm for K=1...10 
using the same data set, where K=1 performs best. Explanation: In real data, there are far 
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more time slots, that correspond to non-attack situations than to attack situations. Thus, 
the K-NN algorithm has more difficulties to distinguish our data sets. 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2
False positive rate
De
te
ct
io
n 
ra
te
Additive correlator w ith threshold:
150-100-50-20-10-5-2
Neural netw ork
1-NN
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Param eter k
De
te
ct
io
n 
ra
te
K-NN
 
Figure 9: (Left) ROC curve for correlation methods.  
(Right) Result of K-NN correlator for different values of parameter K 
Table 2 summarizes the three studied methods utilizing the same data. TP, FP, FN, and 
TN stand for true positives, false positives, false negatives, and true negatives 
respectively.  The overall accuracy is the sum of TP and TN divided by the sum of all 
four values.  
 Type TP FP FN TN 
Detection 
rate 
FP 
rate 
Overall  
accuracy 
Additive  (Thrs.=20) 14 106 4 1931 0,778 0,052 0,946 
Neural network  17 29 1 2008 0,944 0,014 0,985 
1-NN 8 2 10 2035 0,444 0,001 0,994 
Table 2: Correlation result summary 
5 Conclusions 
This paper shows that static and adaptive filtering as well as aggregation is required in 
order to provide a useable pre-processing of realistic IDS datasets. Practical experience 
revealed, that naïve Bayes classifiers reduced the amount of time to create filter rules 
and improved their quality.  
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In order to improve standard methods of correlation, e.g. rule based, three different 
classifiers were tested only operating on information of NIDS, HIDS, and SYSLOG. 
Used as an add-on, these classifiers also provide the benefit to detect unknown attacks. 
The neuronal network performed best.  K-NN was found to be inappropriate for real 
world alarm message classification, where the system has to be adapted to its 
environment.  
Nevertheless, human knowledge about the network, the vulnerabilities and the 
configuration is still inevitable in future.  But an on-line retainable NB-classifier helps 
the expert to adapt the system to it dynamic environment, thus saves valuable time for 
appropriate countermeasures. Moreover the reduced amount and the quality of the 
alarms enable the expert to concentrate on the vital information.  
The work in the Safeguard [Saf03] project is currently in progress, dealing with other 
aspects of recognition, e.g. anomaly detection [BN04], in combination with correlation 
of dynamic topology data, automatic actions, and information presentation to humans. 
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